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“While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion
for the exercise of power.”
– Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes1
I. INTRODUCTION
California renters faced severe challenges long before COVID-19 caused an
economic collapse. 2 For decades, housing production failed to meet demand,
contributing to average monthly rents in the state rising to 50% higher than the rest
of the nation.3 In the metropolitan regions of Los Angeles and the San Francisco
Bay Area, the burden of housing costs affects not just low-wage earners but
moderate-income households as well.4 Even Raul Peralez, an elected official in
San José, could not escape the effects of the affordable housing shortage in his
city.5
The Peralez family lived in their rented home for nine years before their
landlord evicted them, sold the property, and retired. 6 Councilmember Peralez
reluctantly searched for a new home for his wife, six-month-old son, and two dogs,
but he struggled to find affordable options.7 Most advertisements he saw targeted
the more affluent demographic of tech workers in the area. 8 After a “stressful and
really depressing” search, the Peralez family found a smaller home to rent for $600
more per month than they previously paid.9 Councilmember Peralez said that the
1. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1934).
2. See Jill Cowan & Robert Gebeloff, As Rents Outrun Pay, California Families Live on a Knife’s Edge,
N.Y. TIMES: CAL. TODAY (Nov. 19, 2019), https://nyti.ms/330ujv2 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (providing a snapshot of the day-to-day realities of the housing crisis). See generally CAL. DEP’T OF
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING FUTURE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FINAL STATEWIDE
HOUSING ASSESSMENT 2025, at 1–2 (2018), available at https://www.hcd.ca.gov/policy-research/plansreports/docs/SHA_Final_Combined.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter
STATEWIDE HOUSING ASSESSMENT] (summarizing data, challenges, and recommendations regarding the housing
crisis in California).
3. See MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA’S HIGH HOUSING COSTS: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 3 (2015), available at https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/finance/housing-costs/housingcosts.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that in coastal areas, “community
resistance to housing, environmental policies, lack of fiscal incentives for local governments to approve housing,
and limited land constrains new housing construction”).
4. See STATEWIDE HOUSING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 28 (defining low-wage earners as receiving
$30,000–$44,999 annually and moderate-income as $45,000–$74,999 annually).
5. See Nadia Lopez, San Jose Housing Crisis: Councilmember Raul Peralez Evicted from His Home, SAN
JOSÉ SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 28, 2019), https://sanjosespotlight.com/san-jose-housing-crisis-councilmember-raulperalez-evicted-from-his-home/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (observing that “[a]s a
renter in the Silicon Valley, no one is completely safe from eviction”).
6. See id. (quoting Peralez as saying his family was “very sad to leave the home that we were in”).
7. See id. (noting that the family dogs further reduced rental options).
8. See id. (quoting Peralez as supporting affordable housing and tech industry growth in San José: “In my
mind, you can’t have one without the other”).
9. See id. (reporting that the Peralez family downsized from a three-bedroom house with a yard to a twobedroom townhouse without a yard).
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experience helped him better understand the struggles a tenant faces finding
affordable housing in his city.10
The onset of COVID-19 threatened to exploit California’s housing
affordability shortage and create an eviction crisis. 11 On March 27, 2020, Governor
Gavin Newsom placed a temporary moratorium on evictions against renters
impacted by COVID-19.12 The Judicial Council of California suspended all
eviction proceedings soon after. 13 City lawmakers feared a wave of evictions when
statewide eviction moratoriums expired, and Councilmember Peralez cosponsored a proposal to suspend rent for struggling families in San José. 14 The City
Council rejected the plan over concerns it would violate federal and state
constitutions.15 However, the City Council did adopt Councilmember Peralez’s
following proposal to extend a local eviction moratorium and implement a
temporary rent freeze. 16
The Judicial Council extended the statewide eviction moratorium until the
California State Legislature reconvened several months later—delayed after
multiple members and staffers tested positive for COVID-19.17 Just before the
legislative session ended, Governor Newsom signed Chapter 37 to prevent
10. See Lopez, supra note 5 (quoting the Councilmember as saying he thought he resembled “a lot of
individuals that have the same fears of gentrification and being priced out of their own city”).
11. See Isabel Solange Muñoz, The Coronavirus Pandemic Is Making the Housing Crisis Even Worse, THE
CONVERSATION (Apr. 21, 2020), https://theconversation.com/the-coronavirus-pandemic-is-making-the-ushousing-crisis-even-worse-136025 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (warning that the
housing crisis creates displacement and gentrification which “lead to greater inequality, greater social and
economic insecurity and can undermine social cohesion”).
12. Cal. Exec. Order No. N-37-20 (Mar. 27, 2020), available at https://www.gov.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/3.27.20-EO-N-37-20.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
13. See CAL. COURTS, CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT app. I, at 1 (2020), available at
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/appendix-i.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“A
court may not issue a summons on a complaint for unlawful detainer unless the court finds, in its discretion and
on the record, that the action is necessary to protect public health and safety.”).
14. See Nadia Lopez, Coronavirus: San José Lawmakers Propose Suspending Rent, SAN JOSÉ SPOTLIGHT
(Apr. 6, 2020), https://sanjosespotlight.com/coronavirus-san-jose-lawmakers-propose-suspending-rent/ (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on Councilmember Peralez’s proposal with
Councilmember Magdalena Carrasco to waive three months’ rent for tenant households struggling due to COVID19).
15. See Nadia Lopez, San José Strikes Down Proposal to Suspend Rent, Citing Constitutional Concerns,
SAN JOSÉ SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 8, 2020), https://sanjosespotlight.com/coronavirus-san-jose-lawmakers-proposesuspending-rent/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (highlighting City Attorney Rick Doyle’s
concern that the plan would also amount to a taking of private property).
16. See Nadia Lopez, Updated: San José Approves Rent Freeze, Extends Moratorium on Evictions, SAN
JOSÉ SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 14, 2020), https://sanjosespotlight.com/san-jose-mulls-rent-freeze-more-tenantprotections-through-may/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (including concerns from
opposing councilmembers who felt extending the moratorium until the end of 2020 placed a significant burden
on “mom-and-pop landlords”).
17. See Melody Gutierrez, California Legislative Leaders Ask Courts to Keep Coronavirus Eviction Ban
in Place, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-08-05/california-legislativeleaders-judicial-council-delay-lifting-eviction-moratorium-coronavirus (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (noting that the Judicial Council originally planned to vote on whether to end the moratorium in
June).
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evictions through January 31, 2021 where a tenant can demonstrate lost income
due to COVID-19.18 Despite federal and state prohibitions on impairing
contractual obligations, Chapter 37 and other eviction moratoriums are
constitutionally permissible delays in the enforcement of contractual remedies. 19
Chapter 37 is bold and necessary legislation; however, under the Contract Clause,
California lawmakers could use elements of previous proposals to provide more
comprehensive protection for tenants against COVID-19.20
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution and the California Constitution expressly
forbid impairing the obligations of contracts. 21 These prohibitions, however, are
not absolute.22 Section A describes the evolution of judicial evictions as a remedy
for landlords.23 Section B discusses “unlawful detainer”—the primary judicial
eviction process in California.24 Section C explores the constitutional issues raised
by legislation impairing the obligations of contracts. 25 Section D recounts the
provisions of two prominent bills that California lawmakers considered before
enacting Chapter 37.26
A. The Evolution of Judicial Evictions
Landlord–tenant law derives from the feudal system and initially regarded
leases merely as private contracts. 27 Increased urbanization changed society’s
18. See Matt Levin, Analysis: How Renters, Landlords, and Banks Fared in the Eviction Compromise,
CALMATTERS (Aug. 31, 2020), https://calmatters.org/housing/2020/08/renters-landlords-eviction-dealcalifornia-pandemic-moratorium/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting lawmakers
framed the statute as “a stopgap to buy time until the federal government steps in with more direct financial
assistance”).
19. See infra Sections IV.A–B (arguing temporary eviction moratoriums are substantial impairments on
the contractual relationship between landlord and tenant but they reasonably advance the legitimate purpose of
fighting the COVID-19 emergency).
20. See infra Section IV.C (examining how provisions from previous proposals could provide additional
support to combat COVID-19).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State . . . shall pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts . . . .”); see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“[A] law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be
passed.”).
22. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934) (observing that judicial decisions
“put it beyond question that the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like
a mathematical formula”); see also B.E. WITKIN ET AL., Obligation of Contracts, in SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW § 1426 (11th ed. 2020) (identifying permissible changes to remedies and procedures in California contract
law).
23. Infra Section II.A.
24. Infra Section II.B.
25. Infra Section II.C.
26. Infra Section II.D.
27. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 282–83 (9th ed. 2017) (distinguishing between the
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needs, and the law came to recognize a tenant’s property interest in their home.28
A modern lease became both a contract and the conveyance of a right to possess
the property.29
When a tenant breaches an obligation of the lease, the landlord may choose to
terminate the lease. 30 A “holdover tenancy” occurs when a tenant remains in
possession of rented property after the lease ends.31 At common law, “ejectment”
was the only judicial remedy to remove a tenant and recover damages for unpaid
rent.32 Ejectment frequently failed to serve the needs of landlords because the
process was cumbersome and expensive. 33 As a result, property owners often
resorted to “self-help”—taking action outside the judicial system—to retrieve
possession of property from a tenant.34
In the nineteenth century, legislatures developed statutes that created summary
proceedings—non-jury trials that quickly resolve cases—as an alternative to
ejectment and self-help evictions.35 While self-help is often an available remedy to
recover personal property, the modern approach strongly disfavors the practice in
the residential real estate context.36 Today, all states offer a form of summary
proceedings to execute evictions, and almost all states prohibit repossession of
residential real estate property through self-help.37 By offering a safe, efficient, and
legal substitute to self-help evictions, states aim to deter violent, emotionally
charged confrontations between landlords protecting their investments and tenants

landlord’s “seisin” and the tenant’s “possession”).
28. See Randy G. Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and More
Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 761–62 (1994) (describing “a phenomenon
comparable to the pro[-]consumer shift in consumer-producer relations”).
29. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 469 (explaining that the lease creates contractual rights
because “leases usually contain a number of promises . . . such as the promise by the tenant to pay rent or a
promise by the landlord to provide utilities”).
30. See id. at 519–20 (instructing that if a tenant breaches the obligation of a lease and retains possession,
“the landlord may also terminate the lease and recover possession”).
31. See id. at 467–68 (“[C]ommon law rules give the landlord confronted with a holdover essentially two
options—eviction (plus damages), or consent (express or implied) to the creation of a new tenancy.”).
32. See Ejectment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (11th ed. 2019) (defining the writ’s essential allegations
as “(1) the plaintiff has title to the land, (2) the plaintiff has been wrongfully dispossessed or ousted, and (3) the
plaintiff has suffered damages”); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 508 (noting that ejectment “still
exists today, with statutory modifications”).
33. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 508 (concluding that that ejectment “ill served the landlord’s
needs”).
34. See id. (explaining that self-help became “a very important remedy” because ejectment was the
landlord’s only alternative).
35. See Summary Proceeding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (11th ed. 2019) (referencing English statutes
that limited acquittal and condemnation in the proceedings to appointed judges, not juries); see also DUKEMINIER
ET AL., supra note 27, at 508 (noting the common nomenclature of “forcible entry and detainer” statutes).
36. See Adam B. Badawi, Self-Help and the Rules of Engagement, YALE J. ON REG. 1, 24 (2012) (“Nearly
every American jurisdiction has eliminated the ability to exercise this privilege by statute or by court ruling in the
residential domain and most states have done likewise in the commercial context.”).
37. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 506, 508 (noting a dozen states allow for the use of
“peaceable self-help in commercial settings”).
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protecting their homes.38
B. Evictions in California: Unlawful Detainer
When a tenant fails to pay rent on time, the tenant does not automatically
forfeit all interests in the property.39 The tenant’s default only enables the landlord
to use legal mechanisms to terminate the lease. 40 The primary legal process to evict
a tenant in California is the “unlawful detainer” claim, which is much more
prevalent than ejectment. 41 Unlawful detainer’s summary proceeding, enacted by
statute, is a substitute for the landlord’s self-help remedy.42 California expressly
prohibits a landlord from using the self-help eviction techniques of interrupting
utility service, preventing access, and removing doors or windows from rented
property to terminate an occupancy.43
To evict a tenant under the existing statute, a landlord must provide the tenant
who fails to pay rent with at least three days’ written notice. 44 If the tenant defaults
and continues to possess the property without permission after the notice period
elapses, then the tenant violates the unlawful detainer statute.45 The landlord may
then start the unlawful detainer case by filling out several forms and paying the
local court’s administrative fee. 46 The landlord must serve notice of the complaint
to the tenant, who has at least five days to respond.47 If the case goes to summary
proceeding and the landlord is successful, the landlord can ask the local sheriff to

38. See Gerchick, supra note 28, 782 (citing “over-whelming concern for preventing violent confrontations
between angry and frustrated landlords and tenants”).
39. See Davidson v. Quinn, 138 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 9, 11 (1982) (holding that default “does not ipso facto
work a forfeiture of the leasehold”) (quoting Lamey v. Masciotra, 273 Cal. App. 2d 709, 714 (1969)).
40. Id. (emphasizing notice as the “essential element” of the unlawful detainer claim).
41. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1161 (West 2020) (defining the unlawful detainer claim); see also B.E.
WITKIN ET AL., Real Property, in SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 734 (11th ed. 2020) (noting that ejectment
claims are “seldom brought” to evict tenants).
42. See Childs v. Eltinge, 29 Cal. App. 3d 843, 853 (1973) (finding support for the summary proceeding
in the “strong public policy of preserving the peace as well as the recognition of the unique factual and legal
characteristics of the landlord-tenant relationship”); see also supra Section II.A (reviewing the origins of
summary proceedings as a remedy for nonconsensual holdover tenancies).
43. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 789.3 (West 2020) (identifying the landlord’s liability for violations and the
tenant’s right to injunctive relief).
44. See CIV. PROC. § 1161 (requiring a tenant to be in possession of the property, without permission, in
default of rent, served at least three days’ written notice in provisions 1–3).
45. See id. (requiring that the notice period expire in provision 4).
46. See Eviction: Landlords, CALIFORNIA COURTS THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/27701.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2020) (leading landlords through the steps of the
eviction process); see also Kimberlee Leonard, How Long Does It Take to Evict a Tenant in California?, SFGATE
(Dec. 29, 2018), https://homeguides.sfgate.com/long-evict-tenant-california-8035.html (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting fees being “about $435”).
47. See Landlords: Tenants Can Choose to Respond to the Complaint (Step 5 of 7), CALIFORNIA COURTS
THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA, https://www.courts.ca.gov/27757.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2020)
(explaining that landlords must track the different methods and timelines for each tenant).
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give the tenant five days’ notice to vacate. 48
C. The Constitutionality of Canceling the Rent Under the Contract Clause
The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits states from
passing laws that impair the obligations of a contract. 49 A law impairs contractual
obligations when it renders the obligation invalid, releases a party from a promise,
or destroys a duty.50 Constitutional Framer James Madison viewed the Contract
Clause as a “bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights” against the
interference of fluctuating policies from revolving legislatures. 51
The police power is “the sovereign right of the government to protect the lives,
health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people.” 52 The Tenth
Amendment reserves the police power to the states, which limits the authority of
the prohibition in the Contract Clause.53 While the Supreme Court construes the
police power as harmonious with the Constitution’s protective clauses, the police
power “is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.” 54
During the Great Depression, Minnesota enacted the Mortgage Moratorium
Law, which extended the period of time property loan debtors had to repay
lenders.55 In Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, the Supreme Court upheld
the law because an emergency justified exercising the police power to protect
economic interests. 56 The mortgage forbearance was constitutionally permissible
because the temporary legislation addressed a legitimate end, and the provisions
were reasonably “of a character appropriate” to the emergency. 57 In his opinion,
Chief Justice Hughes observed the issue was not “merely that of one party to a
contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the

48. See Leonard, supra note 46, (“While the tenants can ask the court for a stay, meaning more time to
move, the reason must be extreme, such as a medical condition requiring more time to vacate.”).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429
(1934) (defining the obligation of a contract between parties as “the law which binds the parties to perform their
agreement”).
50. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 431 (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819)).
51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
52. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (using examples of contracts relating to liquor,
breweries, and lotteries which may have been legal agreements when parties entered into them, but a legislature’s
exercise of the police power could permissibly impair the contracts’ obligations).
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. (reserving undelegated powers for the States); see also Manigault, 199
U.S. at 480 (explaining that the prohibition of impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent states from
exercising the police power).
54. Manigault, 199 U.S. at 480 (noting that parties may not enter contracts as way to “estop the legislature
from enacting laws intended for the public good”).
55. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416 (“The act provides that, during the emergency declared to exist, relief
may be had through authorized judicial proceedings with respect to foreclosures of mortgages, and execution
sales, of real estate; that sales may be postponed and periods of redemption may be extended.”).
56. Id. at 437 (citing Manigault, 199 U.S. at 480).
57. See id. at 444–48 (avoiding the question of whether the legislation was wise policy).
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economic structure upon which the good of all depends.”58
In Sveen v. Melin, the Supreme Court recently articulated a two-part test to
determine if a state action violates the Contract Clause. 59 First, a court should
determine if the statute substantially impairs the contractual relationship. 60 In its
analysis, the court should evaluate “the extent to which the law undermines the
contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and prevents
the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights.”61 If the statute substantially
impairs the contractual relationship, the court will strike down the statute unless it
appropriately and reasonably advances “a significant and legitimate public
purpose.”62 As the lone dissenter in Sveen, Justice Gorsuch distinguished the
statutes in question from those in Blaisdell.63 Justice Gorsuch emphasized that the
constitutionally permissible mortgage forbearance in Blaisdell altered contractual
remedies and did not release parties from their contractual obligations.64
D. AB 1436 & SB 1410: Prominent Precursors to Chapter 37
During the summer of 2020, the California State Legislature considered
several bills to restrict a landlord from evicting a tenant for failing to pay rent
during the COVID-19 emergency.65 AB 1436 contained an eviction moratorium
giving financially struggling tenants fifteen months after the emergency ended to
repay unpaid rent before incurring liability for unlawful detainer. 66 AB 1436 also
offered up to six months’ mortgage forbearance to homeowners and small
landlords experiencing financial hardship.67 A lending institution could request the
borrower sign an attestation of hardship, but AB 1436 would require the lending
58. Id. at 442.
59. 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1817 (2018) (holding that a Minnesota automatic-revocation-on divorce statute did
not violate the Contracts Clause as applied to the primary designation under a life insurance policy).
60. See id. at 1817 (citing Allied Structural Stell Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978), which
challenged Minnesota’s Private Pensions Benefit Protection Act).
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Energy Reserves Grp. Inc., v. Kan. Power & Light Co. 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983)).
63. See id. at 1830 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting Blaisdell only affected “remedial processes”).
64. Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1830 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Although the Constitution allows legislatures some
flexibility to address changing social conditions through retroactive remedial legislation, it does not permit
upsetting settled expectations in contractual obligations.”).
65. See AB 1436, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended Aug. 14, 2020, but not enacted)
(introducing a previous Homeowner, Tenant, and Small Landlord Relief Act of 2020); see also SB 1410, 2019
Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended Aug. 5, 2020, but not enacted) (creating COVID-19 eviction
relief agreements between a landlord and tenant); Robert M. McCormick, Legislative Alert: Status Report on
SB939 and Commercial Evictions, CAL. LAWS. ASS’N, https://calawyers.org/real-property-law/legislative-alertstatus-report-on-sb939-and-commercial-evictions/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (referencing five other legislative proposals concerning leases during COVID-19).
66. See Cal. AB 1436 § 6 (requiring a landlord intending to evict to provide a tenant with notice informing
the tenant of rights and obligations under the program).
67. Id. § 4 (defining “financial hardship” as a drop of 10% or more in “average gross monthly rental
revenue over the two most recent calendar months”).
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institution to grant an initial request for thirty days’ forbearance.68 A borrower who
signed the attestation could request additional thirty-day periods of forbearance
and could also choose to discontinue the forbearance. 69
AB 1436 expressly permitted a landlord and tenant to enter into a voluntary
agreement that created a schedule to repay rental debt accumulated due to COVID19.70 The bill would only have authorized agreements that allowed a tenant to
remain in possession if the tenant missed a portion or all of one or multiple rental
payments.71 Under AB 1436, the total amount a tenant would pay under the
agreement could not exceed the rental debt and could not include interest or other
fees.72 Any mortgage forgiveness, property tax credits, or other financial assistance
the landlord received to offset rental revenue loss would have offset the tenant’s
COVID-19 rental debt under the agreement.73
The Senate considered SB 1410, which would have authorized a landlord and
tenant to enter into a standardized COVID-19 eviction relief agreement to defer
the tenant’s unpaid rent.74 In exchange, the landlord would receive tax credits equal
to the unpaid rent.75 Tenants who signed a COVID-19 eviction relief agreement
would commit to repay the debt over a span of ten annual installments when they
filed taxes.76 Tenants could apply to California’s Franchise Tax Board (“FTB”) for
a reduction or elimination of an installment based on the tenant’s taxable income
for that year.77 Both the repayment installments and the period available to apply
tax credits were scheduled to begin January 1, 2024, and end December 31, 2034.78
SB 1410 would permit a landlord to sell the interest in the tax credit as an
investment to a third party before the credit could apply in 2024.79
The Assembly Appropriations Committee held SB 1410 after estimating it

68. See id. (requiring the lending institution to provide the first 30 days’ forbearance before canceling for
failure to provide the attestation).
69. See id. (requiring the borrower to make the request during the bill’s effective time period and no less
than 15 days before the end of a forbearance period).
70. See id. § 6 (requiring a landlord to provide a tenant with the terms of the agreement in the language in
which the landlord normally negotiated with the struggling tenant).
71. See Cal. AB 1436 § 6 (providing heightened protection for the tenant).
72. See id. (protecting a tenant from incurring greater liability).
73. See id. (preventing a landlord from unduly profiting from protective measures during the pandemic).
74. See SB 1410, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2020) (as amended Aug. 5, 2020, but not enacted)
(requiring contracting parties to use the version included in the bill or created by the Franchise Tax Board).
75. See id. § 3 (allowing the credit to apply against the “net tax”).
76. See Cal. SB 1410 § 5 (prohibiting the Franchise Tax Board from charging interest unless collections
receives the taxpayer’s unpaid rent balance).
77. See id. § 7 (providing that the FTB may reduce installments for tenants making up to 150% of median
state income and forgive installments for tenants making less than 75% of median state income).
78. See id. § 5 (setting deadlines for the landlord to provide the FTB with a signed copy of the notice and
agreement); see also id. (repealing the statute when it expires); id. § 7 (stating that a tenant shall pay the deferred
rent “beginning on and after January 1, 2024, and before January 1, 2034,” and repealing the section of the bill
when the tax credit program expires).
79. See Cal. SB 1410 § 9 (restricting the third party from re-selling the interest after acquiring it from the
taxpayer).
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could cost hundreds of millions to implement by 2021 and billions more over the
life of the program.80 After AB 1436 faced fierce opposition from landlord and
banking interests, lawmakers came to the compromise of Chapter 37.81 Co-author
of both Chapter 37 and AB 1437, Assembly Member David Chiu, acknowledged
his disappointment:
There is much more I wanted to see in this bill, much more that I fought
for during the negotiations, and much more needed to truly protect renters
in California. But, through the course of negotiations, it became clear that
the choice was not between this proposal and a stronger one. The choice
was between this proposal and nothing.82
III. CHAPTER 37
Chapter 37 prohibited courts from issuing a summons on an unlawful detainer
complaint for failure to pay rent or other charges until October 5, 2020. 83 Courts
could then resume eviction proceedings, but Chapter 37 prohibits a landlord from
using COVID-19 rental debt as the basis for an unlawful detainer claim until
February 2021.84 The act defines “COVID-19 rental debt” as “unpaid rent or any
other unpaid financial obligation of a tenant” that came due March 1, 2020–
January 31, 2021.85 Chapter 37 directs courts to permanently mask unlawful
detainer cases for unpaid rent if the plaintiff filed the complaint between March 4,
2020–January 31, 2021.86
A tenant who signs a declaration of COVID-19 financial distress is not guilty
of unlawful detainer if the tenant pays 25% of COVID-19 rental debt before

80. See Senate Committee on Appropriations, Committee Analysis of SB 1410, at 2 (Aug. 18, 2020)
(assessing the financial impact of SB 1410’s program); see also Senate Judiciary Committee, Committee Analysis
of AB 3088, at 17 (Aug. 29, 2020) (noting that the legislation was held in the Assembly Appropriations
Committee).
81. See Adam Beam, California Governor Signs Eviction Relief Bill Amid Virus, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept.
1, 2020), https://www.sacbee.com/news/article245395075.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (quoting Assembly Member David Chiu: “It’s often said a sign of compromise is both sides are
dissatisfied, and that’s certainly true here”); see also Letter from California Banking Ass’n. et al to the Senate
Comm. on Judiciary (Aug. 5, 2020), available at https://www.aba.com/-/media/documents/letters-to-congressand-regulators/ab-1436-opposition-letter-080620.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(stating opposition to AB 1436); Press Release, California Apartment Ass’n, CAA Negotiates Alternative to AB
1436 (Aug. 28, 2020), available at https://caanet.org/caa-negotiates-alternative-to-AB1436/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (taking credit for the AB 1436’s defeat).
82. Hannah Wiley, Gavin Newsom Has a Deal on a California Eviction Ban. Here Is What You Need to
Know, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.sacbee.com/news/article245395075.html (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
83. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1179.01.5 (enacted by Chapter 37).
84. Id. § 1179.03 (enacted by Chapter 37).
85. Id. § 1179.02 (enacted by Chapter 37).
86. Id. § 1161.2 (enacted by Chapter 37).
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February 2021.87 “COVID-19 financial distress” is lost income or increased outof-pocket expenses related to essential work, childcare, care for elderly or sick
family members, and other circumstances related to COVID-19.88 If a landlord has
proof indicating a tenant’s income is 130% of median income for the county, the
landlord may require the tenant to provide documentation of lost income.89
Otherwise, a tenant is not required to provide documentation of COVID-19
financial distress beyond the declaration.90
Chapter 37 temporarily increases the written notice requirement to evict a
tenant from three to fifteen days.91 The act requires landlords to provide tenants
with an unsigned declaration of financial distress due to COVID-19 when serving
a notice of eviction.92 Chapter 37 also increases a landlord’s liability for self-help
evictions by $1,000–$2,500 where a tenant has signed a declaration of COVID-19
financial distress. 93 A landlord engaging in retaliatory conduct against a tenant who
exercises Chapter 37 rights—such as reporting tenants to immigration
authorities—may not recover possession for six months.94
Chapter 37 converts a tenant’s COVID-19 rental debt to civil debt, which can
be legally pursued through methods such as tax levies and wage garnishment.95
The act also provides procedural protections in the event of foreclosure, until
January 1, 2023.96 If a mortgage servicer denies requested forbearance to a covered
borrower, the lending institution must provide a reason for that denial. 97 Chapter
37 also requires mortgage servicers to review borrowers for “solutions” that
government agencies permit and provide twenty-one days to fix errors in an
application for forbearance. 98 However, Chapter 37 does not require a mortgage
servicer to provide forbearance to borrower.99
IV. ANALYSIS
Chapter 37—as well as AB 1436 and SB 1410—constitutionally delay the
enforcement of contractual remedies using an eviction moratorium as an exercise

87. Id. § 1179.03 (enacted by Chapter 37).
88. CIV. PROC. § 1179.03.5 (enacted by Chapter 37).
89. Id. § 1179.02 (enacted by Chapter 37) (basing median income on data from the Department of Housing
and Community Development).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 1179.03 (enacted by Chapter 37).
92. Id.
93. CAL. CIV. CODE § 789.4 (enacted by Chapter 37).
94. Id. § 1942.5 (enacted by Chapter 37).
95. See generally CIV. PROC. § 116.223 (enacted by Chapter 37) (waiving jurisdictional limits on small
claims courts).
96. CIV. § 2924.15 (enacted by Chapter 37).
97. Id. § 3273.10 (enacted by Chapter 37).
98. Id. § 3273.11 (enacted by Chapter 37).
99. Id. § 3273.10 (enacted by Chapter 37).
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of the police power.100 Section A explains how an eviction moratorium
substantially impairs the contractual relationship between a tenant and a
landlord.101 Section B argues that an eviction moratorium during the COVID-19
crisis reasonably advances “a significant and legitimate public purpose” by
considering the character of the crisis for landlords and tenants. 102 Section C
proposes that integrating provisions from AB 1436 and SB 1410 with Chapter 37
could create a more comprehensive approach to protecting California’s tenants and
landlords during and after the COVID-19 pandemic.103
A. An Eviction Moratorium Substantially Impairs the Contractual Relationship
Between Landlords and Tenants
To determine whether a law substantially impairs a contractual relationship,
the Supreme Court evaluates “the extent to which the law undermines the
contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and prevents
the party from safeguarding or reinstating his rights.”104 A tenant’s promise to
make timely rent payments is part of the contractual bargain of a lease.105
Landlords reasonably rely on steady rental revenue to pay mortgages, maintenance
costs, and property taxes—the latter of which fund essential community services
like schools, police, and fire departments.106
A landlord’s obligations may compel the landlord, particularly an individual
investor with few properties, to replace a tenant who fails to pay rent with a paying
tenant.107 Some small landlords, such as Councilmember Peralez’s former
landlord, use their properties to directly finance their retirement.108 Without
100. See AB 1436, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2020) (as amended Aug. 14, 2020, but not
enacted) (listing the intent as avoiding “widespread economic and social harm . . . until after the public health
emergency passes and the financial consequences begin to ease”).
101. Infra Section IV.A.
102. Infra Section IV.C.
103. Infra Section IV.B.
104. Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1817 (2018).
105. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 469 (explaining that a lease is both a conveyance and an
agreement creating contractual rights).
106. See Robert Pinnegar, The Long-Term Impact of Unpaid Rent Must Be Acknowledged, WASH. POST.
(May 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/11/long-term-impact-unpaid-rent/ (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (claiming that 14% of landlord revenue from rent goes to property
taxes which funds “schools and teachers, police, firefighters and other essential services on which all community
members rely”); see also Jacob Passy, ‘Landlords Are Just Trying to Pay Bills Like Everyone Else.’ The
Coronavirus Could Hit Mom-and-Pop Landlords Hard as Tenants Miss Rent Payments, MARKETWATCH (Mar.
26, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/landlords-are-just-trying-to-pay-bills-like-everyone-else-thecoronavirus-could-hit-mom-and-pop-landlords-hard-as-tenants-miss-rent-payments-2020-03-25 (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing these expenses and noting “property taxes can add up to the same
amount or more than the mortgage payment on a property, depending on where it is located”).
107. See Gerchick, supra note 28, at 767 (observing that “filing an eviction suit is a last resort taken after
weeks or months of allowing the tenant additional opportunities to cure his default”).
108. See Lopez, supra note 5 (noting Councilmember Peralez’s landlord “decided to sell the property and
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financial assistance, small landlords may lose everything they worked for. 109
However, Chapter 37 does not prevent a landlord from safeguarding or
reinstating their rights.110 Legislation such as Chapter 37 is temporary, so a
landlord remains entitled to the entire original debt due under the lease after the
effective time period.111 If a tenant has a high income, Chapter 37 provides a
mechanism for landlords to require documentation from the “unscrupulous
tenant[] who would lie and claim a hardship.”112 On balance, an eviction
moratorium does substantially alter the relationship between landlords and tenants
but limits that alteration to the remedy of eviction.113
B. An Eviction Moratorium Reasonably and Appropriately Advances the Fight
Against COVID-19.
Because an eviction moratorium substantially alters contractual relationships,
an eviction moratorium violates the Contract Clause unless it appropriately and
reasonably advances “a significant and legitimate public purpose.”114 State
governments have not only a significant and legitimate interest in fighting the
spread of COVID-19, but a compelling interest. 115 Subsection 1 describes the
character of the COVID-19 crisis specifically as it applies to tenants and
landlords.116 Subsection 2 argues that keeping people sheltered reasonably
advances the fight against COVID-19.117

retire”); see also Landlord Toolkit: How to Fund Your Retirement with Rental Income, THE ALLSTATE BLOG
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.allstate.com/blog/landlord-toolkit-fund-retirement-rental-income/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (advertising insurance to prospective individual investors).
109. See Tim Logan, As Eviction Bans Continue, Small Landlords Feel the Squeeze, BOS. GLOBE (July 27,
2020), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/07/27/business/eviction-ban-continues-small-landlords-feel-squeeze/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting a landlord in a dispute with her tenant).
110. See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1817 (2018) (defining the second prong of the test for violations
of the Contract Clause).
111. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934) (requiring that legislation that
impairs the obligations of contracts be temporary to be constitutional).
112. See Senate Judiciary Committee, Committee Analysis of AB 3088, at 9 (Aug. 29, 2020) (noting that
a major point of contention regarding AB 1436 was whether AB 1436 required tenants to provide documentation).
113. Cf. Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1830 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Sveen from Blaisdell noting
that Blaisdell only affected “remedial processes”).
114. See id. at 1817 (quoting Energy Reserves Grp. Inc., v. Kan. Power & Light Co. 459 U.S. 400, 411–
12 (1983)) (turning the inquiry toward “whether the state law is drawn in an ‘appropriate’ and ‘reasonable’ way
to advance ‘a significant and legitimate public purpose’” after finding substantial impairment).
115. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1614 (2020) (noting California’s
compelling interesting to fight COVID-19 as part of a religious discrimination analysis).
116. Infra Subsection IV.B.1.
117. Infra Subsection IV.B.2.
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1. The Character of the COVID-19 Crisis for Tenants and Landlords in
California
California tenants are especially vulnerable to the economic and health impacts
of the COVID-19 emergency.118 In April 2020, the national unemployment rate
rose to its highest level since the Great Depression.119 California’s unemployment
rate for the same month was the highest recorded since the agency began tracking
the data in 1976.120 Employment rebounded slightly after businesses partially reopened, but millions remain unemployed.121 Economists warned that jobs the crisis
destroyed might never return; a study from the University of Chicago forecasted
that “32 to 42 percent of COVID-induced layoffs will be permanent.” 122
Job losses impacted renters in California especially hard. 123 Renters in the state
are more likely to work in sectors directly impacted by COVID-19, including
service and entertainment industries.124 University of California Berkeley
researchers estimated that COVID-19 immediately impacted industries employing

118. Elizabeth Kneebone & Cecile Murray, COVID-19 and California’s Vulnerable Renters, TERNER CTR.
BLOG: NO LIMITS (Aug. 4, 2020), https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/blog/covid-19-and-vulnerable-renterscalifornia (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
119. See Greg Iacurci, Unemployment is Nearing Great Depression Levels, CNBC (May 19, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/19/unemployment-today-vs-the-great-depression-how-do-the-erascompare.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The official unemployment rate hit 14.7%
in April, its highest since the Great Depression . . . .”); see also Samantha Fields, How Did Everyone Get the
Unemployment Rate Wrong?, MARKETPLACE (June 8, 2020), https://www.marketplace.org/2020/06/08/how-dideveryone-get-the-unemployment-rate-wrong/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting
that the Bureau of Labor Statistics acknowledged they misclassified “unemployed on temporary layoff workers”
and estimating that without this error the rate would have been 19.7%).
120. See Press Release, Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, California Unemployment Lowers Slightly to 16.3 Percent in
May (June 19, 2020), available at https://edd.ca.gov/newsroom/unemployment-june-2020.htm (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“April’s revisions reflect unprecedented job losses . . . that are a direct
result of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.”).
121. Kneebone & Murray, supra note 118, (reporting that 2.8 million Californians were still unemployed
in June 2020).
122. See JOSE MARIA BARRERO ET AL., BECKER FRIEDMAN INST. FOR ECON. AT THE UNIV. OF CHI.,
COVID-19 IS ALSO A REALLOCATION SHOCK 4 (2020), available at https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wpcontent/uploads/BFI_WP_202059.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (forecasting similar
results from recent job losses from other sources); see also Olivia Rockeman & Jill Ward, One-Third of U.S. Job
Losses Are at Risk of Becoming Permanent, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (June 14, 2020, 4:00 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/one-third-of-u-s-job-losses-are-at-risk-of-becomingpermanent (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that another study from the Peterson
Institute for International Economics said “that the unique shock of the virus means governments may need to do
more to preserve businesses and protect workers than they would in a normal recession”).
123. See Elizabeth Kneebone & Cecile Murray, Estimating COVID-19’s Near Term Impact on Renters,
TERNER CTR. BLOG: NO LIMITS (Apr. 24, 2020), https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/blog/estimating-covid-19impact-renters (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (estimating “the number of renter
households likely facing income losses due to economic impacts of efforts to slow the spread of COVID-19”).
124. See id. (underscoring “the need for targeted rental assistance—especially in higher-cost areas and as
arrears mount for households waiting to receive UI (or those unable to claim it)”).
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people in 40% of tenant households in California. 125 Housing costs burdened half
of these tenants before the pandemic, and researchers expect the economic crisis
will increase their burden and introduce burden to new households.126
Landlords also face unprecedented challenges. 127 The National Multifamily
Housing Council reported nearly one-third of renters failed to pay rent on time
during the first full calendar month after the shelter-in-place order.128 In San
Francisco alone, one in thirteen tenants broke their lease in the first 100 days after
the order.129 Across the nation, some landlords forgave rent as a show of empathy
in a time of crisis.130 Other landlords filed eviction notices in defiance or ignorance
of government orders.131 In California alone, landlords evicted more than 1,600
renter households between March 2020 and August 2020.132
While tenants and landlords are both affected by the COVID-19 pandemic,
they did not enter the crisis on equal footing.133 On a broad scale, significant tax
deductions are available to property owners, but there are no correlating tax benefit
for tenants.134 Low-income tenants are sometimes eligible for housing vouchers,

125. See id. (detailing statistical data by state in the appendix).
126. See id. (“While households that did not have cost burdens before the crisis may now be facing housing
insecurity or trouble paying rent due to COVID-related income impacts, income losses are likely to make the
near-term situation of previously cost-burdened renters particularly acute.”).
127. See generally Passy, supra note 106 (warning of a “situation unlike anything landlords today have
faced before”).
128. See Chris Arnold, Nearly a Third of Renters Didn’t Pay by 1st Week of April, NPR (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/08/829850505/millions-didnt-pay-rent-lastweek-amid-pandemic-woes (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting the National
Multifamily Housing Council’s data).
129. See J.K. Dineen, SF Tenants Break Leases in Startling Numbers, Giving Renters Upper Hand, S.F.
CHRON. (June 18, 2020), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/SF-tenants-break-leases-in-startlingnumbers-15347851.php (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that the industry does not
track broken leases as a metric but “it’s clearly way above normal”).
130. See, e.g., Christopher Brito, Landlord Says He Won’t Collect Rent Because of Coronavirus Outbreak,
Urges Others to Do the Same, CBS NEWS (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/landlord-says-hewont-collect-rent-because-of-coronavirus-outbreak-urges-others-to-do-the-same-maine-renting/ (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on a viral social media post).
131. See Jeff Ernsthausen et al., Despite Federal Ban, Landlords Are Still Moving to Evict People During
the Pandemic, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/despite-federal-ban-landlordsare-still-moving-to-evict-people-during-the-pandemic (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(reporting on landlords in four states that violated the federal eviction moratorium).
132. See Matt Levin et al, Exclusive: More Than 1,600 Californians Have Been Evicted During the
Pandemic, CALMATTERS (Aug. 11, 2020), https://calmatters.org/housing/2020/08/californians-evictedcoronavirus-pandemic/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that 1,600 is “likely a
significant undercount of how many renters have been forced to leave” because fourteen county sheriffs’
departments representing fourteen million Californians did not respond to data requests).
133. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 542–43 (9th ed. 2017) (discussing retaliatory evictions and
tenants’ lack of knowledge of protections like the warranty of habitability).
134. See Publication 936 (2019), Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/publications/p936 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how to
deduct home mortgage interest); see also RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF
HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 180 (2017) (arguing that this disparity in the federal tax code
perniciously subsidized suburban homeowners without equal treatment for renters).
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but available funding limits the availability of vouchers—unlike guaranteed tax
deductions that property owners receive. 135 These disparities between
governmental support for property owners and tenants perpetuate residential
segregation and other systemic inequities laid bare by the COVID-19 crisis.136
At an individual level, many families facing eviction do not have the options
that Councilmember Peralez’s family had.137 Before COVID-19, the affordable
housing shortage was already “driving poor families into financial ruin and even
starting to engulf families with moderate incomes.” 138 Eviction of poor people
from their homes is common and, to some extent, part of the landlord’s economic
model.139 For the evicted, the experience can foster feelings of insecurity,
powerlessness, and depression in people so that eviction not only perpetuates
poverty in communities, it creates poverty.140
The inalienable rights of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” require
stable housing to enjoy.141 Home is inextricably intertwined with an individual’s
life, liberty, and happiness because it provides privacy, security, protection, and
comfort.142 Stable housing enables a person to seek and maintain gainful
employment that allows them to enjoy their liberty.143 However, federal and state
governments have reduced support for housing assistance in recent years,
reflecting the nation’s failure to recognize housing as a human right.144 Before the
pandemic, California accounted for 22% of the nation’s homeless population, even
135. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 134, at 209 (highlighting the difference in property owners being
guaranteed their benefit, but tenant support like Section 8 public housing are first come first serve).
136. See id. at 180 (2017) (“Because de jure policies of segregation ensured that whites would more likely
be owners and African Americans more likely be renters, the tax code contributes to making African Americans
and whites less equal, despite the code’s purportedly nonracial provisions.”); see also Liam Petterson,
Coronavirus Weekly: Racism, COVID-19, and the Inequality That Fuels These Parallel Pandemics, THE
CONVERSATION (June 9, 2020), https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-weekly-racism-covid-19-and-theinequality-that-fuels-these-parallel-pandemics-140255 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(identifying reasons why people of color experience a greater impact from the COVID-19 crisis).
137. See supra Part I (telling the story of Peralez’s eviction and move to a smaller home that cost $600
more per month). See generally MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
(1st Paperback ed. 2017) (detailing the larger system problems affecting eight families in Milwaukee, WI).
138. See DESMOND, supra note 137, at 303 (noting “1 in 5 of all renting families nationwide spends half
of its income on housing”) (emphasis in original).
139. See generally David A. Dana, An Invisible Crisis in Plain Sight: The Emergence of the “Eviction
Economy,” Its Causes, and the Possibilities for Reform in Legal Regulation and Education, 115 MICH. L. REV.
935 (2017) (reviewing MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (1st
Paperback ed. 2017)).
140. See id. at 937 (“Desmond explains that this Eviction Economy is terrible not just for the tenants who
are part of it but also for the neighborhoods and cities in which these tenants live.”).
141. See DESMOND, supra note 137, at 300 (comparing housing to the tenets of the Declaration of
Independence).
142. See id. (observing that “it’s almost impossible to think about one without the other”).
143. See id. (“A stable home allows us to strive for self-reliance and personal expression, to seek gainful
employment and enjoy individual freedoms.”).
144. See Dana, supra note 139 (finding no evidence of the political will necessary to fund affordable
housing initiatives).
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though the state only represented 12% of the nation’s total population.145 Governor
Newsom lamented this failure in his State of the State Address just before the
COVID-19 crisis struck.146 He said, “Let’s call it what it is, a disgrace, that the
richest state in the richest nation—succeeding across so many sectors—is failing
to properly house, heal, and humanely treat so many of its own people.” 147
Economists and housing experts warned that without an intervention, a
national surge in evictions could cause the homeless population to increase as
much as 45%.148 The City and County of San Francisco count tents and vehicles
to better understand the state of the homeless population.149 In April 2020, the tent
count increased citywide by 71%.150 In the Tenderloin, a neighborhood with a high
population density and acute homelessness, tents and other structures nearly
tripled.151 To protect the city’s homeless population from COVID-19, San
Francisco relocated nearly 500 people from the Tenderloin encampments into
hotels and other shelters. 152
Spread of COVID-19 through the homeless population threatens the state’s
ability to control the virus.153 The homeless population may struggle to comply
with the Center for Disease Control’s recommendation to socially distance because
the population relies on shelters, food distribution centers, and public
transportation hubs.154 Additionally, 25%–50% of the homeless population are

145. See STATEWIDE HOUSING ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at (describing the California’s share of the
homeless population as disproportionate).
146. See Governor Gavin Newsom, State of the State Address (Feb. 19, 2020), available at
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/02/19/governor-newsom-delivers-state-of-the-state-address-on-homelessness/ (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (announcing budget plans and record reserves prior to the
arrival of COVID-19).
147. Id.
148. See Benjamin Oreskes, Mass Unemployment over Coronavirus Could Lead to a 45% Jump in
Homelessness, Study Finds, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/202005-14/coronavirus-unemployment-homeless-study-increase-45-percent (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (reporting primarily on Columbia University economics professor Dan O’Flaherty’s study).
149. See HEALTHY STS. OPERATIONS CTR., CITY & CTY. OF S.F., TENDERLOIN NEIGHBORHOOD PLAN FOR
COVID-19,
at
4
(May
6,
2020),
available
at
https://sf.gov/sites/default/files/202005/Tenderloin_Neighborhood_Plan_May_6_2020.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(ensuring essential services remain available to residents of the city).
150. See id. (representing the only tent count since the beginning of the crisis).
151. Id.
152. See Rachel Swan & Tal Kopan, SF Cleans Up Tenderloin—Dramatic, 65% Drop-Off in Homeless
Tent Camps, S.F. CHRON. (July 3, 2020), www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-cleans-up-Tenderloindramatic-65-15383753.php (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the city’s removal
of “the appalling crush of tent camps” as “one of the most intensive street-camp cleanups in city history”).
153. See Amy Maxman, Coronavirus Is Spreading Under the Radar in Homeless Shelters, NATURE (May
7, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01389-3 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (“Evidence-based solutions might protect not only the roughly 1.4 million people who use a homeless
shelter or transitional housing in the United States each year . . . but also other people who don’t have the luxury
of separating themselves from others.”).
154. See generally People Experiencing Homelessness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/homelessness.html (last updated Aug. 10,
2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (outlining the struggles of the population without
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employed, many of them as low-wage essential workers, further increasing their
risk of contracting and spreading the virus to other groups.155
2. Delaying Enforcement of Lease Obligations Reasonably Advances the
Fight to Stop the Spread of COVID-19
An eviction moratorium may prevent a rise in homelessness, which could lead
to further spread of COVID-19.156 Chapter 37 also leverages notice requirements
to ensure that a landlord may not legally evict a tenant without providing
information about how these laws affect their ability to stay housed.157 Chapter 37
voids any unlawful detainer claim where the landlord fails to provide the tenant
with an unsigned attestation of financial hardship when serving a notice of
eviction.158 Without these requirements, many tenants may not be aware of the
protections available to them.159
Chapter 37 also protects tenants against retaliatory evictions—evictions
initiated in response to behavior “with which the landlord does not agree.”160
Retaliatory evictions not only punish tenants for undesirable behavior, but also
send messages to the landlord’s surrounding tenants about the behavior.161 Without
this important protection, landlords could leverage the affordability crisis against
tenants who caused them the trouble of complying with Chapter 37. 162 Masking
COVID-19 credit debt further promotes tenants finding new housing and protects
tenants from “unscrupulous” operators that use the information to prey on evicted
tenants.163

adequate shelter during the COVID-19 crisis).
155. See Megan Lupo et al, Homeless Essential Workers Face Greater Risk of COVID-19, ABC NEWS
(Aug. 26, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/homeless-essential-workers-face-greater-risk-covid19-72624388 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the “common misconception that
homeless people are unemployed”).
156. See supra Subsection IV.B.1 (arguing that mass evictions could lead to a rise in homelessness, which
could hinder the state’s ability to fight COVID-19).
157. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1179.03 (enacted by Chapter 37) (requiring landlords who intend to
evict to provide an unsigned declaration of COVID-19 financial distress).
158. Id.
159. Cf. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 542–43 (discussing tenants’ lack of use of the warranty of
habitability).
160. Ejectment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
161. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 27, at 542–43 (noting most jurisdictions today prohibit the
practice).
162. Cf. id. (observing few jurisdictions extend the protection to commercial tenants).
163. See Senate Judiciary Committee, Committee Analysis of AB 3088, at 11 (Aug. 29, 2020) (specifically
referencing “eviction defense” schemes that charge fees with little or no hope to help the tenant prevail).
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C. Provisions from AB 1436 and SB 1410 Can Provide Landlords and Tenants
More Comprehensive Relief
Chapter 37 is a bold plan that could prevent a disastrous rise in evictions
threatening to compound this public health catastrophe.164 However, a multifaceted approach that incorporates provisions from AB 1436 and SB 1410 could
provide more comprehensive protection reasonably “of a character appropriate” to
the COVID-19 emergency.165
The provisions of AB 1436 would dramatically increase protections for
struggling tenants by providing fifteen months to pay missed rent before incurring
liability for unlawful detainer. 166 However, even fifteen months may not be enough
time for tenants to financially stabilize after changing careers in the face of
permanent job loss in their industry.167 The provisions of SB 1410 could also
provide landlords and tenants an option to enter into an agreement to give tenants
a longer time to repay the rent.168 Also, SB 1410 would authorize the FTB to reduce
or forgive the debt for covered tenants with lower-income when payments come
due in 2024.169 Under SB 1410, the state government would provide a landlord
who enters into a COVID-19 eviction relief agreement compensation in the form
of tax credits beginning in 2024.170 Landlords who could not afford to wait several
years for unpaid rent would be able to sell the interest in their tax credits to
investors for immediate relief. 171
Moreover, the provisions of AB 1436 could improve on Chapter 37 by
requiring mortgage forbearance rather than merely encouraging it through
procedural protections.172 While landlords may have had to demonstrate financial
hardship under AB 1436, the plan would require lending institutions to provide up

164. See supra Subsection IV.B.2 (arguing that keeping people in their homes advances the cause of
fighting COVID-19.
165. See generally AB 1436, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended Aug. 14, 2020, but not
enacted) (granting fifteen months for tenants to repay rent and landlords up to six months of mortgage
forbearance); SB 1410, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended Aug. 5, 2020, but not enacted)
(creating a ten-year program to pay back rent). See also supra Section II.C (arguing that provisions must be “of a
character appropriate” to the circumstances in order to be constitutional) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445).
166. See Cal. AB 1436 § 6 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1179.02).
167. See Rockeman & Ward, supra note 122 (predicting the “labor market will initially recover swiftly,
but then level off with millions still unemployed”).
168. See generally Cal. SB 1410 (creating a program to repay rent over ten years through the FTB).
169. See id. § 5 (creating COVID-19 eviction relief agreements between a landlord and tenant).
170. See id. § 1 (allowing participating landlords to claim the tax credit any year between 2024 and 2033).
171. See John Myers, California Considers Unprecedented $25-billion Economy Recovery Fund, Rental
Relief, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-12/coronavirus-rentrelief-tax-vouchers-plan (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (observing that vouchers for
future tax credits could be “valuable to a variety of investors”).
172. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3273.10 (enacted by Chapter 37) (providing procedural protections for
borrowers in case the lender refuses forbearance).
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to six months forbearance if landlords requested it. 173 Including mortgage
forbearance can provide security for landlords and provides a better alternative
than self-help evictions or retaliatory conduct.174
V. CONCLUSION
By the end of 2020, COVID-19 killed over 25,000 people in California and
nearly 350,000 nationwide.175 Public health officials hope safe vaccines will be
widely available in 2021.176 Days before Chapter 37’s provision expired, state
lawmakers extended California’s eviction moratorium through June 30, 2021.177
In the meantime, COVID-19 continues to batter the economy and may create longterm damage.178
Chapter 37 offers a bold solution to a potential eviction crisis, but it is a
temporary program.179 The rejected provisions of AB 1436 and SB 1410 are costly,
but they offer possibilities for more comprehensive protection. 180 However,
inequities between landlords and tenants will persist until housing is recognized as
a basic human right.181 This pandemic furnishes the occasion for California to find
the political and financial will to recognize that universal access to decent,
affordable housing protects us all. 182

173. See AB 1436, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. § 4 (Cal. 2020) (as amended Aug. 14, 2020, but not
enacted) (requiring landlords to show a drop of rental revenue but servicer to offer forbearance).
174. Cf. Gerchick, supra note 28, at 765–66 (making recommendations to further improve summary
proceedings to discourage the use of extrajudicial evictions).
175. Jason Green, Coronavirus: After Record Deaths End 2020, California’s Year of COVID-19 in
Perspective, MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/01/01/coronavirus-afterrecord-deaths-end-2020-californias-year-of-covid-19-in-perspective/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
176. Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., Dr. Fauci Says Coronavirus Vaccine Likely Won’t Be “Widely” Available
Until Months into 2021, CNBC (July 24, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/24/dr-fauci-says-coronavirusvaccine-likely-wont-be-widely-available-until-months-into-2021.html (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
177. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1179.02 (enacted by 2021 Stat. Ch. 2).
178. Paul Davidson, Coronavirus Likely to Leave Legacy of Fear and Uncertainty That Holds Back
Economy
for
Decades,
U.S.A.
TODAY
(Sept.
3,
2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/09/03/economy-covid-19-pandemic-long-term-economiceffects/5696187002/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
179. See infra Part III and Sections IV.A–B (reviewing the provisions and arguing that its measures are
permissible under the Contract Clause).
180. See infra Sections II.D, IV.C (highlighting provisions that can offer more comprehensive protection).
181. See infra Section IV.B (discussing the disparity in support available for homeowners compared to
tenants).
182. C.f. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“While emergency does not
create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.”).
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